(5) Furthermore I give the name of praise to the pleasure,
with which we conceive the action of another, whereby he has endeavoured
to please us; but of blame to the pain wherewith we feel aversion to his
action.
Prop. [XXX] If anyone has done something which he conceives as
affecting other men pleasurably, he will be affected
by pleasure, accompanied by the idea of himself as
cause; in other words, he will regard himself with
pleasure. On the other hand, if he has done anything
which he conceives as affecting others painfully,
he will regard himself with pain.
Proof.- (30:1) He who conceives, that he affects others with pleasure or
pain, will, by that very fact, himself be affected with pleasure or pain
([xxvii] ), but, as a man (II:[xix] and II:[xxiii] ) is conscious of
himself through the modifications whereby he is determined to action, it
follows that he who conceives, that he affects others pleasurably, will
be affected with pleasure accompanied by the idea of himself as cause; in
other words, will regard himself with pleasure. (2) And so mutatis
mutandis in the case of pain. Q.E.D.
Note.- (30:3) As love ([xiii] ) is pleasure accompanied by the idea of
an external cause, and hatred is pain accompanied by the idea of an
external cause; the pleasure and pain in question will be a species of
love and hatred.
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