(22:5) We will call the love towards him who confers a benefit on another,
Approval; and the hatred towards him who injures another, we will call
Indignation. (6) We must further remark, that we not only feel pity for a
thing which we have loved (as shown in [xxi] ), but also for a thing
which we have hitherto regarded without emotion, provided that we deem
that it resembles ourselves (as I will show presently). (7) Thus, we
bestow approval on one who has benefitted anything resembling ourselves,
and contrariwise, are indignant with him who has done it an injury.
Prop. [XXIII] He who conceives, that an object of his hatred is
painfully affected, will feel pleasure. Contrariwise,
if he thinks that the said object is pleasurably
affected, he will feel pain. Each of these emotions
will be greater or less, according as its contrary is
greater or less in the object of hatred.
Proof.- (23:1) In so far as an object of hatred is painfully affected,
it is destroyed, to an extent proportioned to the strength of the pain
([xi] note). (2) Therefore, he ([xx] ) who conceives, that
some object of his hatred is painfully affected, will feel pleasure,
to an extent proportioned to the amount of pain he conceives in the
object of his hatred. (3) This was our first point. (4) Again,
pleasure postulates the existence of the pleasurably affected thing
([xi] note), in proportion as the pleasure is greater or less.
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