(3) This was our first point.
(4) Further, in so far as a thing is affected with pain, it is to that
extent destroyed, the extent being in proportion to the amount of pain
([xi] note); therefore ([xix] ) he who conceives, that the
of his love is affected painfully, will himself be affected painfully,
in proportion as the said emotion is greater or less in the object of
love. Q.E.D.
Prop. [XXII] If we conceive that anything pleasurably affects
some object of our love, we shall be affected with
love towards that thing. Contrariwise, if we conceive
that it affects an object of our love painfully, we
shall be affected with hatred towards it.
Proof.- (22:1) He, who affects pleasurably or painfully the object of our
love, affects us also pleasurably or painfully - that is, if we conceive
the loved object as affected with the said pleasure or pain ([xxi] ).
(2) But this pleasure or pain is postulated to come to us accompanied
by the idea of an external cause; therefore ([xiii] note), if we
conceive that anyone affects an object of our love pleasurably or
painfully, we shall te affected with love or hatred towards him. Q.E.D.
Note.- (22:3) [xxi] explains to us the nature of Pity, which we may define
as pain arising from another's hurt. (4) What term we can use for pleasure
arising from another's gain, I know not.
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