Proof.- (48:1) The mind is a fixed and definite mode of thought ([xi] .),
therefore it cannot be the free cause of its actions (I:[xvii] Coroll.ii.);
in other words, it cannot have an absolute faculty of positive or negative
volition; but (by I:[xxviii] ) it must be determined by a cause, which has
also been determined by another cause, and this last by another, &c.
Q.E.D.
Note.- (48:2) In the same way it is proved, that there is in the mind no
absolute faculty of understanding, desiring, loving, &c. (3) Whence it
follows, that these and similar faculties are either entirely fictitious,
or are merely abstract or general terms, such as we are accustomed to
put together from particular things. (4) Thus the intellect and the will
stand in the same relation to this or that idea, or this or that volition,
as "lapidity" to this or that stone, or as "man" to Peter and Paul.
(48:5) The cause which leads men to consider themselves free has been
set forth in the I:[Appendix] of Part 1. (6) But, before I proceed
further, I would here remark that, by, the will to affirm and decide,
I mean the faculty, not the desire. (7) I mean, I repeat, the faculty,
whereby the mind affirms or denies what is true or false, not the desire,
wherewith the mind wishes for or turns away from any given thing.
(48:8) After we have proved, that these faculties of ours are general
notions, which cannot be distinguished from the particular instances
on which they are based, we must inquire whether volitions themselves
are anything besides the ideas of things.
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