Prop.[XLI] Knowledge of the first kind is the only source of
falsity, knowledge of the second and third kinds
is necessarily true.
Proof.- (41:1) To knowledge of the first kind we have (in the foregoing
note [40:19] ) assigned all those ideas, which are inadequate and confused;
therefore this kind of knowledge is the only source of falsity ([xxxv] ).
(2) Furthermore, we assigned to the second and third kinds of knowledge
those ideas which are adequate; therefore these kinds are necessarily true
([xxxiv] ). Q.E.D.
PROP.[XLII] Knowledge of the second and third kinds,
not knowledge of the first kind, teaches
us to distinguish the true from the false.
Proof.- (42:1) This proposition is self-evident. (2) He, who knows how to
distinguish between true and false, must have an adequate idea of true and
false. (3) That is ([xl] , second or third kind of knowledge.
Prop.[XLIII] He, who has a true idea, simultaneously knows that
he has a true idea, and cannot doubt of the
of the thing perceived.
Proof.- (43:1) A true idea in us is an idea which is adequate in God,
in so far as he is displayed through the nature of the human mind ([xi]
Coroll.). (2) Let us suppose that there is in God, in so far as he is
displayed through the human mind, an adequate idea, A. (3) The idea of
this idea must also necessarily be in God, and be referred to him in
the same way as the idea A (by [xx] , whereof the proof is of universal
application).
Pages:
99
100
101
102
103
104
105
106
107
108
109
110
111
112
113
114
115
116
117
118
119
120
121
122
123