Q.E.D.
Prop.[XXXVII] That which is common to all (cf. [L.II] above),
and which is equally in a part and in the whole,
does not constitute the essence of any particular
thing.
Proof.- (37:1) If this be denied, conceive, if possible, that it
constitutes the essence of some particular thing; for instance, the
essence of B. (2) Then ([D.ii] ) it cannot without B either exist
or be conceived; but this is against our hypothesis. (3) Therefore
it does not appertain to B's essence, nor does it constitute the
essence of any particular thing. Q.E.D.
Prop.[XXXVIII] Those things, which are common to all, and
which are equally in a part and in the whole,
cannot be conceived except adequately.
Proof.- (38:1) Let A be something, which is common to all bodies, and
which is equally present in the part of any given body and in the whole.
I say A cannot be conceived except adequately. (2) For the idea thereof
in God will necessarily be adequate ([vii] Coroll.), both in so far as
God has the idea of the human body, and also in so far as he has the
idea of the modifications of the human body, which ([xvi] , [xxv] ,
[xxvii] ) involve in part the nature of the human body and the nature
of external bodies; that is ([xii] , [xiii] ), the idea in God will
necessarily be adequate, both in so far as he constitutes the human mind,
and in so far as he has the ideas, which are in the human mind.
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