(I:[xxviii ] ) (2) As we
have shown in the foregoing proposition, from this common property of
particular things, we have only a very inadequate know ledge of the
duration of our body; we must draw a similar conclusion with regard
to the duration of particular things, namely, that we can only have a
very inadequate knowledge of the duration thereof. Q.E.D.
Corollary.- (31:3) Hence it follows that all particular things are
contingent and perishable. (4) For we can have no adequate idea of
their duration (by [xxx] ), and this is what we must understand by
the contingency and perishableness of things. (I:[xxxiii] , Note i.)
(31:5) For (I:[xxix] ), except in this sense, nothing is contingent.
Prop.[XXXII] All ideas, in so far as they are
referred to God, are true.
Proof.- (32:1) All ideas which are in God agree in every respect with
their objects ([vii] Coroll.), therefore (I:[A.vi] ) they are all true.
Q.E.D.
Prop.[XXXIII] There is nothing positive in ideas,
which causes them to be called false.
Proof.- (33:1) If this be denied, conceive, if possible, a positive mode
of thinking, which should constitute the distinctive quality of falsehood.
(2) Such a mode of thinking cannot be in God ([xxxii] ); external to God
it cannot be or be conceived (I:[xv] ). (3) Therefore there is nothing
positive in ideas which causes them to be called false.
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