Q.E.D.
Note.- (17:6) We thus see how it comes about, as is often the case, that
we regard as present things which are not. It is possible that the same
result - may be brought about by other causes; but I think it suffices
for me here to have indicated one possible explanation, just as well as
if I had pointed out the true cause. (7) Indeed, I do not think I am
very far from the truth, for all my assumptions are based on postulates,
which rest, almost without exception, on experience, that cannot be
controverted by those who have shown, as we have, that the human body,
as we feel it, exists (Coroll. after [xiii] ). (8) Furthermore ([vii]
Coroll., [xvi] Coroll.ii.), we clearly understand what is the difference
between the idea, say, of Peter, which constitutes the essence of Peter's
mind, and the idea of the said Peter, which is in another man, say, Paul.
(17:9) The former directly answers to the essence of Peter's own body,
and only implies existence so long as Peter exists; the latter indicates
rather the disposition of Paul's body than the nature of Peter, and,
therefore, while this disposition of Paul's body lasts, Paul's mind will
regard Peter as present to itself, even though he no longer exists.
(17:10) Further, to retain the usual phraseology, the modifications of the
human body, of which the ideas represent external bodies as present to us,
we will call the images of things, though they do not recall the figure of
things.
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