(13:7) The propositions we have advanced hitherto have been entirely
general, applying not more to men than to other individual things, all
of which, though in different degrees, are animated (Animata"). (8) For
of everything there is necessarily an idea in God, of which God is the
cause, in the same way as there is an idea of the human body; thus
whatever we have asserted of the idea of the human body must necessarily
also be asserted of the idea of everything else. (13:9) Still, on the other
hand, we cannot deny that ideas, like objects, differ one from the other,
one being more excellent than another and containing more reality, just
as the object of one idea is more excellent than the object of another
idea, and contains more reality.
(13:10) Wherefore, in order io determine, wherein the human mind differs
from other things, and wherein it surpasses them, it is necessary for us
to know the nature of its object, that is, of the human body. (11) What
this nature is, I am not able here to explain, nor is it necessary for
the proof of what I advance, that I should do so. (12) I will only say
generally, that in proportion as any given body is more fitted than others
for doing many actions or receiving many impressions at once, so also is
the mind, of which it is the object, more fitted than others for forming
many simultaneous perceptions; and the more the actions of one body depend
on itself alone, and the fewer other bodies concur with it in action,
the more fitted is the mind of which it is the object for distinct
comprehension.
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