ii] ), and, consequently, man would necessarily
exist, which is absurd ([A.i] ). Therefore, &c. Q.E.D.
Note.- (10:3) This proposition may also be proved from I:[v] , in which
it is shown that there cannot be two substances of the same nature; for
as there may be many men, the being of substance is not that which
constitutes the actual being of man. (4) Again, the proposition is
evident from the other properties of substance - namely, that substance
is in its nature infinite, immutable, indivisible, &c., as anyone may
see for himself.
Corollary.- (10:5) Hence it follows, that the essence of man is
constituted by certain modifications of the attributes of God.
(6) For (by [ix] ) the being of substance does not belong to the
essence of man. (7) That essence therefore (by I:[xv] ) is
something which is in God, and which without God can neither be
nor be conceived, whether it be a modification (I:[xxv] Coroll.),
or a mode which expresses God's nature in a certain conditioned
manner.
Note.- (10:8) Everyone must surely admit, that nothing can be or be
conceived without God. (9) All men agree that God is the one and only
cause of all things, both of their essence and of their existence;
that is, God is not only the cause of things in respect to their
being made (secundum fieri), but also in respect to their being
(secundum esse).
(10:10) At the same time many assert, that that, without which a thing
cannot be nor be conceived, belongs to the essence of that thing;
wherefore they believe that either the nature of God appertains to the
essence of created things, or else that created things can be or be
conceived without God; or else, as is more probably the case, they hold
inconsistent doctrines.
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