(33) Wherefore, I may turn the argument against its employers,
as follows: All things depend on the power of God. (34) In order that
things should be different from what they are, God's will would necessarily
have to be different. (35) But God's will cannot be different (as we have
just most clearly demonstrated) from God's perfection. (36) Therefore
neither can things be different. (37) I confess that the theory which
subjects all things to the will of an indifferent deity, and asserts that
they are all dependent on his fiat, is less far from the truth than the
theory of those, who maintain that God acts in all things with a view of
promoting what is good. (38) For these latter persons seem to set up
something beyond God, which does not depend on God, but which God in
acting looks to as an exemplar, or which he aims at as a definite goal.
(33:39) This is only another name for subjecting God to the dominion of
destiny, an utter absurdity in respect to God, whom we have shown to be
the first and only free cause of the essence of all things and also of
their existence. (33:40) I need, therefore, spend no time in refuting
such wild theories.
PROP. [XXXIV] God's power is identical with his essence.
Proof.- (34:1) From the sole necessity of the essence of God it follows
that God is the cause of himself ([xi] ) and of all things ([xvi] and
Coroll.
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