(33:27) Further, all the philosophers whom I have read admit that God's
intellect is entirely actual, and not at all potential; as they also admit
that God's intellect, and God's will, and God's essence are identical, it
follows that, if God had had a different actual intellect and a different
will, his essence would also have been different; and thus, as I concluded
at first, if things had been brought into being by God in a different way
from that which has obtained, God's intellect and, will, that is (as is
admitted) his essence would perforce have been different, which is absurd.
(33:28) As these things could not have been brought into being by God in
any but the actual way and order which has obtained; and as the truth of
this proposition follows from the supreme perfection of God; we can have
no sound reason for persuading ourselves to believe that God did not wish
to create all the things which were in his intellect, and to create them
in the same perfection as he had understood them.
(33:29) But, it will be said, there is in things no perfection nor
imperfection; that which is in them, and which causes them to be called
perfect or imperfect, good or bad, depends solely on the will of God.
(30) If God had so willed, he might have brought it about that what is
now perfection should be extreme imperfection, and vice versa. (31) What
is such an assertion, but an open declaration that God, who necessarily
understands that which he wishes, might bring it about by his will, that
he should understand things differently from the way in which he does
understand them? (33:32) This (as we have just shown) is the height of
absurdity.
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