(33:8) A thing of which we do not know whether the essence does or does not
involve a contradiction, or of which knowing that it does not involve a
contradiction, we are still in doubt concerning the existence, because the
order of causes escapes us,--such a thing, I say, cannot appear to us
either necessary or impossible. (9) Wherefore we call it contingent or
possible.
Note II- (33:10) It clearly follows from what we have said, that things
have been brought into being by God in the highest perfection, inasmuch
as they have necessarily followed from a most perfect nature. (11) Nor
does this prove any imperfection in God, for it has compelled us to affirm
his perfection. (12) From its contrary proposition, we should clearly
gather (as I have just shown), that God is not supremely perfect, for if
things had been brought into being in any other way, we should have to
assign to God a nature different from that, which we are bound to
attribute to him from the consideration of an absolutely perfect being.
(33:13) I do not doubt, that many will scout this idea as absurd, and will
refuse to give their minds up to contemplating it, simply because they are
accustomed to assign to God a freedom very different from that which we
([D.vii] ) have deduced. (14) They assign to him, in short, absolute free
will. (15) However, I am also convinced that if such persons reflect on
the matter, and duly weigh in their minds our series of propositions, they
will reject such freedom as they now attribute to God, not only as nugatory,
but also as a great impediment to organized knowledge.
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