Proof.- (33:1) All things necessarily follow from the nature of God
([xvi] ), and by the nature of God are conditioned to exist and act in a
particular way ([xxix] ). (2) If things, therefore, could have been of
a different nature, or have been conditioned to act in a different way,
so that the order of nature would have been different, God's nature would
also have been able to be different from what it now is; and therefore
(by [xi] ) that different nature also would have perforce existed, and
consequently there would have been able to be two or more Gods.
(33:3) This (by [xiv] Coroll. i.) is absurd. (4) Therefore things
could not have been brought into being by God in any other manner, etc.
Q.E.D.
Note I.- (33:5) As I have thus shown, more clearly than the sun at noonday,
that there is nothing to justify us in calling things contingent, I wish to
explain briefly what meaning we shall attach to the word contingent; but I
will first explain the words necessary and impossible.
(33:6) A thing is called necessary either in respect to its essence or in
respect to its cause; for the existence of a thing necessarily follows,
either from its essence and definition, or from a given efficient cause.
(7) For similar reasons a thing is said to be impossible; namely, inasmuch
as its essence or definition involves a contradiction, or because no
external cause is granted, which is conditioned to produce such an effect;
but a thing can in no respect be called contingent, save in relation to
the imperfection of our knowledge.
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