(3) Thus, however it be conceived, whether as
finite or infinite, it requires a cause by which it should be conditioned
to exist and act. (32:4) Thus ([D.vii] ) it cannot be called a free cause,
but only a necessary or constrained cause. Q.E.D.
Corollary. I.- (32:5) Hence it follows, first, that God does not act
according to freedom of the will.
Corollary II.- (32:6) It follows secondly, that will and intellect stand
in the same relation to the nature of God as do motion, and rest, and
absolutely all natural phenomena, which must be conditioned by God ([xxix] )
to exist and act in a particular manner. (7) For will, like the rest,
stands in need of a cause, by which it is conditioned to exist and act
in a particular manner. (8) And although, when will or intellect be
granted, an infinite number of results may follow, yet God cannot on that
account be said to act from freedom of the will, any more than the infinite
number of results from motion and rest would justify us in saying that
motion and rest act by free will. (32:9) Wherefore will no more appertains
to God than does anything else in nature, but stands in the same relation
to him as motion, rest, and the like, which we have shown to follow from
the necessity of the divine nature, and to be conditioned by it to exist
and act in a particular manner.
PROP. [XXXIII] Things could not have been brought into being
by God in any manner or in any order different
from that which has in fact obtained.
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