(2) Now thought,
in so far as it is supposed to be an attribute of God, is necessarily
(by [xi] ) in its nature infinite. (3) But, in so far as it possesses
the idea of God, it is supposed finite. It cannot, however, be conceived
as finite, unless it be limited by thought (by Def. ii.); but it is not
limited by thought itself, in so far as it has constituted the idea of
God (for so far it is supposed to be finite); therefore, it is limited
by thought, in so far as it has not constituted the idea of God, which
nevertheless (by [xi] ) must necessarily exist.
(21:4) We have now granted, therefore, thought not constituting the idea
of God, and, accordingly, the idea of God does not naturally follow from
its nature in so far as it is absolute thought (for it is conceived as
constituting, and also as not constituting, the idea of God), which is
against our hypothesis. (5) Wherefore, if the idea of God expressed in
the attribute thought, or, indeed, anything else in any attribute of God
(for we may take any example, as the proof is of universal application)
follows from the necessity of the absolute nature of the said attribute,
the said thing must necessarily be infinite, which was our first point.
(21:6) Furthermore, a thing which thus follows from the necessity of the
nature of any attribute cannot have a limited duration. (7) For if it
can suppose a thing, which follows from the necessity of the nature of
some attribute, to exist in some attribute of God, for instance, the
idea of God expressed in the attribute thought, and let it be supposed
at some time not to have existed, or to be about not to exist.
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