(15:46) I think I have now answered the second argument; it is, in fact,
founded on the same assumption as the first, namely, that matter, in so
far as it is substance, is divisible, and composed of parts. (47) Even
if it were so, I do not know why it should be considered unworthy of the
divine nature, inasmuch as besides God (by [xiv] ) no substance can be
granted, wherefrom it could receive its modifications. (48) All things,
I repeat, are in God, and all things which come to pass, come to pass
solely through the laws of the infinite nature of God, and follow (as I
will shortly show) from the necessity of his essence. (49) Wherefore it
can in nowise be said, that God is passive in respect to anything other
than himself, or that extended substance is unworthy of the Divine nature,
even if it be supposed divisible, so long as it is granted to be infinite
and eternal. (15:50) But enough of this for the present.
PROP. [XVI] From the necessity of the divine nature must follow
an infinite number of things in infinite ways, that is,
all things which can fall within the sphere of infinite
intellect.
Proof.- (16:1) This proposition will be clear to everyone, who remembers
that from the given definition of any thing the intellect infers several
properties, which really necessarily follow therefrom (that is, from the
actual essence of the thing defined); and it infers more properties in
proportion as the definition of the thing expresses more reality, that is,
in proportion as the essence of the thing defined involves more reality.
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