(8:13) Therefore, for a person to say that he has a
clear and distinct, that is, a true idea of a substance, but that he is not
sure whether such substance exists, would be the same as if he said that he
had a true idea, but was not sure whether or not it was false (a little
consideration will make this plain); or if anyone affirmed that substance
is created, it would be the same as saying that a false idea was true, in
short, the height of absurdity. (8:14) It must, then, necessarily be
admitted that the existence of substance as its essence is an eternal
truth. (8:15) And we can hence conclude by another process of reasoning--
that there is but one such substance. (16) I think that this may
profitably be done at once; and, in order to proceed regularly with the
demonstration, we must premise:--
(8:17) 1. The true definition of a thing neither involves nor
expresses anything beyond the nature of the thing
defined. From this it follows that--
(8:18) 2. No definition implies or expresses a certain number of
individuals, inasmuch as it expresses nothing beyond the
nature of the thing defined. (18a) For instance, the
definition of a triangle expresses nothing beyond the actual
nature of a triangle: it does not imply any fixed number of
triangles.
(8:19) 3. There is necessarily for each individual existent thing a
cause why it should exist.
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